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Abstract
The effect of self-default on the valuation of liabilities and derivatives
(DVA) has been widely discussed but the effect on assets has not received
similar attention. Any asset whose value depends on the status, or exis-
tence, of the firm will have a DVA. We extend [BK11] to provide a hedging
strategy for such assets and provide an in-depth example from the balance
sheet (Goodwill). We calibrate our model to seven US banks over the cri-
sis period of mid-2007 to 2011. This suggests that their reported profits
would have changed significantly if DVA on assets, as well as liabilities,
was included — unless the DVA was hedged.
1 Introduction
The effect of self-default on the valuation of liabilities and derivatives (DVA) has
been widely discussed in the pricing literature [BK11, Bri11, CAC+10, PPB11,
Cre´12]. However, the effect of self-default on assets has yet to attract similar
attention ([KS12] being an exception), although it is clear that default will affect
any asset that depends on company existence or performance.
We provide a hedging strategy for pricing DVA on assets extending [BK11],
and consider an example, Goodwill, in depth. We calibrate our model to seven
US banks over the crisis period of mid-2007 to 2011 and show how their reported
profits would have changed if DVA on this asset, as well as liabilities, had been
included. This effect is highly significant for at least four of the seven banks.
FAS 157 requires US banks to reflect their own potential nonperformance,
which includes creditworthiness, in the fair value of their liabilities [FAS10].
However, creditworthiness has effects on balance sheet items beyond liabilities.
This can be observed by their change in value upon default of the company
holding them. This may appear surprising, but it is clear that any asset that
relies on the company being a going concern will exhibit this behavior, e.g.
Goodwill, brand values, etc. In fact Goodwill can be written down prior to
default, and thus have a major effect on balance sheets even for going concerns.
∗The views expressed are those of the authors only, no other representation
should be attributed.
†Contact: chris.kenyon@lloydsbanking.com; Richard D. Kenyon is a Senior Lecturer in
Accountancy at Northampton Business School
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We include this in our model and calibration. Thus we demonstrate how FAS
157 can be applied to the asset side of the balance sheet as well as the liability
side. We do not propose a change in how Goodwill is derived [RW10]. Instead we
propose an adjustment that is applied subsequently to reflect creditworthiness
effects.
2 Hedging DVA on Assets
We take the view that own-assets can be sensitive to own-stock price levels as
well as own-default. Thus we can model, for example, progressive writedowns
on a banks’ Goodwill as its stock price decreases. We modify [BK11] in that
we have no risky counterparty, and extend it in that the own-asset (the bank
stock) S(t) jumps to zero on bank default. As [BK11] we assume that a riskless
bond can be purchased. Thus under the historical measure we have:
dP (t)/P (t−) = rdt
dPb(t)/Pb(t−) = rbdt− dJb
dS(t)/S(t−) = µdt+ σdW − dJb (1)
where:
P, Pb(t): price of riskless and risky bonds respectively;
r, rb: riskless interest rate and risky rate applicable to purchased and issued
bonds respectively (issued bonds can be repurchased);
W : Brownian driving process;
Jb: jump to default of the bank;
S: is the stock of the bank. Note that the only jump in S-value comes on
bank default. There are no market-based jumps in S-value.
We could use a non-zero recovery on the bank’s issued bonds, but we assume
zero recovery for computational convenience as in [BK11].
Let V̂ be the value of an own-asset that depends on the bank’s own stock,
and the banks existence (i.e. it also depends on bank default). If the bank
defaults at τ then:
V̂ (τ, S) = M+(τ, S) +RbM
−(τ, S)
where M is the value of the own-asset at default. We keep this value general
for now (allowing positive and negative values). This enables us to model either
hedging the asset or hedging the loss on the asset on default, which will be
important later.
Our setup is simpler than [BK11] in that we only need to consider own-
default, however we include a risky underlying (S(t)) which has consequences.
The value V Π(t) of the hedging portfolio Π(t) can be written in terms of the
price processes P∗ of its components:
−V Π(t) = Π(t) = δ(t)PS(t) + αb(t)PPb(t) + Pβ(t)
where δ(t) is the quantity of stock held, αb(t) risky bond holdings, and Pβ(t) is
the price of the cash. We require the portfolio to be self-financing, so (bearing
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in mind [BBPL12]) we have the following gain G∗ processes:
dGS = dS + (γ − q)Sdt
dGPb = rbPbdt− PbdJb
dGβ = r+dt+ rF −dt
Note that all gain processes are functions of t− not t. γS(t) is the dividend yield
on S(t) and qS(t) is the financing cost. As in [BK11], we assume we can put
S(t) into repo and we also assume it closes flat on default. Equally we assume
zero recovery for the stock lender when we are short selling. If the cash position
is positive, riskless investment yields r, whereas negative cash costs the funding
rate rF . We can set the funding rate to the yield of an issued bond with recovery
Rb, so rF = r + (1−Rb)λb. The price processes P∗ are:
PS = 0; PPb = Pb; Pβ = .
The stock price process is zero except exactly at the instant of default but this
portfolio cannot be bought (no trading exactly at τ). Note that the dividend
processes D∗ (with time zero values of zero) are not individually zero:
dDS = dGS − dPS = dS + (γ − q)Sdt
dDPb = dGPb − dPPb = rbPbdt− dPb
dDβ = dGβ − dPβ = r+dt+ rF −dt
Self-financing requires that GΠ = V Π and replication requires that V Π = V̂ , so
GΠ = V̂ . Considering V Π we have:
−V Π = δ × 0 + αb × Pb + 1×  =⇒  = −V̂ − αbPb
Now the portfolio gain process GΠ is by definition the weighted sum of the
individual gains, hence:
dGΠ = δ(dS + (γ − q)Sdt) + αb(rbPbdt− PbdJb)
+ {r(−V̂ − αbPb)+ + rF (−V̂ − αbPb)−}dt (2)
Applying Ito’s lemma to V̂ we have:
dV̂ = ∂tV̂ dt+ ∂S V̂ dS +
1
2
σ2S2∂SS V̂ dt
+ (V̂ (τ)− V̂ (τ−)− S(τ−)∂S V̂ (τ−))dJb (3)
where τ is the default time of the bank and that the bank can only jump once
to default. Notice that the jump term in dS leads to one additional term within
the last bracket. Positive V̂ means long b-risk so the coefficient of Pb, αb will
be positive or zero.
Removing all risks by equating the dS and dJb coefficients within Equations
2 and 3 (which are equal):
δ(t) = ∂S V̂ (t)
αb(t) = −(V̂ (τ)− V̂ (τ−)− S(τ−)∂S V̂ (τ−))/Pb(τ−)
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If we now define a parabolic differential operator At as:
At <>:= 1
2
σ2S2∂SS <> + {λb + (qS − γS)}S∂S <> (4)
and
λb := rb − r
sF := rF − r
then V̂ satisfies the PDE
∂tV̂ +AtV̂ − rV̂ = sF (V̂ + ∆V̂ + S∂S V̂ )+ − λb(∆V̂ + S∂S V̂ ) (5)
= λbV̂ + sF (M
+ +RbM
− + S∂S V̂ )+
− λb(RbM− +M+ + S∂S V̂ ) (6)
∂tV̂ + A˜tV̂ − rV̂ = λbV̂ + sF (M+ +RbM− + S∂S V̂ )+
− λb(RbM− +M+) (7)
We move to Equation 7 by absorbing the λbS∂S V̂ term into At relabelling it A˜t.
Note that the terms inside the sF -bracket are evaluated with the share price
pre-default (funding occurs only whilst not defaulted), whereas the terms inside
the λb-bracket are evaluated post-default.
We have been able to remove the jump risk from the PDE because the value
of the stock is known pre-default and its jump size on default is also known. We
needed to use both the stock itself and the own-bond to remove all the jump
risk from the portfolio (especially the stock), i.e. both δ and αb were used.
Below we assume that we can put V̂ into repo so sF = 0 hence:
∂tV̂ + A˜tV̂ − rV̂ = λb(V̂ − (RbM− +M+)) (8)
3 Example Asset: Goodwill
3.1 Introduction to the Asset
Goodwill is an asset on the balance sheet that is reported quarterly. In our
examples we consider seven large US banks, five are chosen for size and the
other two as representative pure investment banks. These banks have significant
levels of Goodwill on their balance sheets as compared to quarterly profits, see
Figure 1.
Goodwill (defined in FAS 350-20) is created, amongst other possibilities,
when a company is bought for more than the fair value of net assets acquired and
liabilities assumed. The carrying value of Goodwill must be regularly reviewed
(at least annually, in a two step proceedure1), and can only stay at the same level
or be impaired, i.e. decrease (FAS 350-20-35-13). The basis for the carrying
value is as though it were purchased anew (-35-14). Thus we assume that the
value of Goodwill is capped on the balance sheet at its initial amount.
In regulatory terms Goodwill is not counted towards capital (Basel III),
effectively saying that it has zero recovery value. That is, it provides no buffer
1The first step is to see whether it is more likely than not(> 50% likely) that the carrying
value exceeds the fair value (FASB updates 2011-08, 2012-02).
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Figure 1: Left panel: Reported Goodwill for seven US banks (Bloomberg
tickers: BAC; WFC; JPM; C; COF; MS; GS) in Billion USD. Right panel:
Quarterly profits as a percentage of Goodwill. For the non-pure-investment-
banks this is a small percentage. For the two investment banks (GS, MS)
Goodwill is relatively small and profits are the same order of magnitude. Data
is from Bloomberg.
against default. IFRS 9 puts it into Other Comprehensive Income, which feeds
into Equity, and it will remain on the balance sheet.
For tax purposes some information (e.g. USC Title 26 A.1.B.VI Section
197) suggests that Goodwill must be amortized over 15 years. We use the word
suggests to remind readers that this is a paper exploring the application of DVA
to assets, not a definitive tax or accounting opinion. This amortization creates
tax credits that can reduce tax payments on future profits.
Tax treatments change present and future cashflows, whereas accounting
treatments change reports and opinions.
3.2 Models for Goodwill
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Figure 2: Left panel: Stock prices for seven US banks relative to their 2H2007
values. Right panel: Derived calibration curves for Goodwill write-offs versus
minimum stock price observed since mid 2007.
We consider three models of Goodwill value, two inspired by accounting and
one from tax. First examine Figure 2 where we show relative equity prices from
mid 2007 on the left, and relative Goodwill value (considering only writedowns)
versus maximum stock price drop on the right. Despite significant stock price
5
drops three of the seven banks considered wrote down less than 10% of their
Goodwill. Thus we propose the following three models.
CONSTANT the dollar value of Goodwill never changes.
PROGRESSIVE as the stock price drops Goodwill is gradually written off.
AMORTIZING Goodwill is amortized linearly over a fixed number of years.
The last model is inspired by USC Title 26 A.1.B.VI Section 197, mentioned
above. In general we would use a combination of CONSTANT and PROGRES-
SIVE since, for example, Bank C did not write down 50% of Goodwill despite
a 90%-plus drop in stock price.
3.3 DVA on Goodwill
We define DVA on Goodwill as the expected loss from default or degradation of
the company. Degradation is measured by decline in stock price. Our hedging
methodology above includes both possibilities. Typically there is no recovery
on Goodwill as it represents part of going concern value.
Goodwill is not a tradeable asset in the normal sense used in mathematical
finance. As a thought experiment consider the simplified case that Goodwill
has a constant dollar value up to the default of the company. No self-financing
portfolio could duplicate this value as it always decreases in a risk neutral mea-
sure (with positive interest rates) as we consider longer horizons. Furthermore,
Goodwill generates no cashflows (even when written down), but has a non-zero
value today.
Although Goodwill itself is not a tradeable asset, DVA on Goodwill is a
tradeable asset, at least in the sense that we can hedge it. We will be precise
later, but for now we continue the thought experiment. Suppose we buy a
zero-recovery CDS with notional equal to the Goodwill, very long maturity
(sufficiently high that the probability of default is close to unity), zero upfront
cost, and a given periodic premium payment. We can hedge this using a zero-
recovery bond from the company, and riskless bank account (ignoring different
borrowing and lending costs for the moment, that we cover below) [Car05]. This
CDS perfectly compensates us for the loss of value on default of the company
(assuming no counterparty risk on the CDS itself). This works because unit
notional CDS hedge bond notionals not their coupons. This is the intuition
behind the application of the hedging strategy of the Section 2.
3.3.1 CONSTANT Model
To hedge the loss of Goodwill value k on default the bank enters into a trade V̂
that pays k on bank default, and zero otherwise. Note that the hedge will not
require a position in S. For V̂ to be riskless we assume that it is collateralized
and since the value will always be positive to the bank this means, effectively,
that the derivative can be placed into repo and thus sF = 0. Hence M
+ = k,
M− = 0 and Equation 6 becomes:
∂tV̂ + A˜tV̂ − rV̂ = λbV̂ − λbk
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Feynman-Kac transforms this to:
V̂ = EQ
[∫ T
0
e−(r+λb)sλbk ds
]
=
λb
r + λb
k − ε(T ) (9)
where ε(T ) can be made arbitrarily small as T →∞.
Equation 9 says that if the hazard rate is large relative to the riskless rate
then the DVA on Goodwill will tend to the value of Goodwill itself. This makes
sense because Goodwill is lost on default and a high hazard rate implies this
happens soon.
3.3.2 AMORTIZING Model of Goodwill
If Goodwill is amortizing in a straight line this means that, in tax terms, it
creates a loss every year that can be offset against profits, these are called tax
credits. We model the future value of the tax credits as:
GAM(t) =
nA∑
i=dte
e−r(i−dte)
G(0)
nA
where we have assumed that tax is paid once per year at the end of the year
and amortization is over nA years (an integer). This is a simple extension of
the CONSTANT model because the values are deterministic. Thus, as before
the hedge will not require a position in S.
In this view of the value of Goodwill there is no link to the value of the
company, or to any revaluation of Goodwill after its creation. The value is set
by law. Of course the DVA on Goodwill is still set by the chance of default, and
the relevant hedging strategy.
The value of a tax credit obviously depends on having profits, however the
profit does not always have to be in the same year as the tax credit. There is
usually a (limited) ability to move these through time when a company does not
have sufficient profits to use up tax credit, which then becomes a deferred tax
credit. The formula above assumes that sufficient profits exist to use up all the
tax credit as they appear. We show below that the DVA in this AMORTIZING
model is relatively insensitive to the length of the amortization. Thus whether
the generated tax credits are used immediately, or not, is not highly significant.
3.3.3 PROGRESSIVE Model
Goodwill is written off progressively as the equity price declines, considering the
minimum stock price reached. We want to hedge these losses, i.e. this DVA on
Goodwill.
Calibration In general the precise relationship between equity price declines
and Goodwill writeoff is one for internal analysts to answer as they are the ones
calculating the value of Goodwill. However, looking back historically we can
recover the calibration curves that internal analysts would have calculated.
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Figure 2 shows the monotonic decline in Goodwill with minimum stock price
reached (at quarter ends). Note that this model leaves open the possibility that
the writedown occurs with a delay after the barrier (stock price minimum) is
reached. This can occur, but there is typically just one big drop in the period,
so we leave this detail out of the modeling, it is a straightforward extension
(delayed cashflow). The calibration set of barriers and losses is shown in Table
1.
Hedging consists of instruments that give positive cash-flows when the stock
price reaches successive barriers. Thus we can write DVA on Goodwill in terms
of a series of American-style binary (cash-or-nothing) options V̂i. Practically we
have captured aspects of a structural model of approach-to-default with these
barriers (as opposed to reduced form).
The hedges are bought options and hence always positive-valued. Since we do
not want counterparty risk on the options we assume that they are collateralized
and hence sF = 0. Unlike the CONSTANT case, on default these options pay
the loss amounts li since the stock price will have breached the respective barrier.
Thus we have a similar PDE but with different boundary conditions:
∂tV̂i + A˜tV̂i − rV̂i = λbV̂i − λbli (10)
provided S ≥ bi where (bi, li) is the (barrier,loss) pair.
We can evaluate Equation 10 as an integral over standard one-touch options
with rebates for not touching with different maturities, since default is inde-
pendent of stock price. A one-touch option is not a free boundary problem so
the PDE we have can be used with suitable boundary coniditions, see [Wil06]
9.7 for details. We choose the rebates to be liλbe
−(r+λb)T for maturity T , thus
capturing the payout at default when the stock price goes to zero, provided the
barrier has not previously been reached.
The no-hit-rebate-at-T -of-R option price RnoH(T,R) is known:
RnoH(T,R) = Re−rT −R ((S/bi)2ζPd(b2i /S; bi) + Cd(S; bi))
where Cd, Pd are digital call and put options and ζ = 1/2− (r− γ)/σ2. Hence
the DVA on Goodwill under the PRGRESSIVE model is:∑
i
V̂i =
∑
i
∫ T
0
li (OneTouch(bi, s) + RnoH(s, 1))λbe
−λbs ds
It is beyond the scope of this paper to — from the outside — estimate future
calibrations for Goodwill. However, making the assumption that internal teams
could create a good calibration, we can use the historical data to reproduce it
after the fact, see Figure 2 and Table 1. Thus we can calculate their DVA on
Goodwill throughout the crisis period as would have been reported.
8
BAC WFC JPM C COF MS GS
b loss b loss b loss b loss b loss b loss b loss
49 0.1 40 2.5 90 0.1 33 9.0 85 4.8 90 14.2 39 7.9
14 18.5 55 1.5 13 28.7 60 0.9 52 1.8
13 0.3 5 7.6 41 6.3 33 0.8
11 1.0 23 24.5
19 0.5
Table 1: Calibration for Goodwill as sets of binary cash-or-nothing American
options. When the barrier b, as a percentage of mid 2007 stock price, is hit then
the Goodwill loss (percent) occurs (see text for details).
4 Results
4.1 CONSTANT and PROGRESSIVE models
We calibrate the PROGRESSIVE model using historical data mid-2007 to end-
2011 on seven US banks see Figure 2 (right panel) and Table 1. Stock implied
volatility is from Bloomberg using ATM volatility at the longest consistently
available quote (18 months). We use the 5Y CDS spread as representative
together with the 5Y swap rate for discounting. The Goodwill that was not lost
over this period we assign to the CONSTANT model.
Figure 3 shows the effect on reported quarterly profits of including changes
in DVA on Goodwill. The two investment banks (GS and MS) see little effect on
their reported profits. This is because they have little Goodwill relative to their
profits and it was little affected by writedowns over the crisis period. One major
bank (C) showed initially large effects which were later much reduced. This is
because C wrote off a significant fraction of Goodwill over the crisis and sub-
sequently was only affected by CDS changes. The remaining four major banks
show volatile effects over the crisis period. This reflects their large amounts of
Goodwill, the crisis, and in some cases changes resulting from acquisitions.
4.2 AMORTIZING model
Figure 4, left panel, shows the value of future Goodwill for the AMORTIZING
model, which is inspired by tax considerations. The the staircase effect from
paying tax yearly is evident. There is a strong dependence on the length of the
amortization period (which can be set by law).
The DVA on tax credits from Goodwill amortization is shown in Figure 4
right panel. There is a relatively small range of values for a wide range of
amortizing lengths, 10–20 years. The amortization range is important in that
it shows that the results are robust against deferrement of the use of the tax
credits. This potentially captures the case where the credits can only be used
one third to half the time. If, net, there are no profits over a long continuous
period then the tax credits may not be used (also because there will be other
sources of tax credits). However, such cases are likely already captured by the
default probability.
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Figure 3: Effect on reported quarterly profits of including changes in DVA on
Goodwill. Five large banks are shown as well as two investment banks (bottom
row). DVA on Goodwill model is the combined PROGRESSIVE+CONSTANT
using historically calibrated barriers.
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5 Discussion
DVA on liabilities and derivatives is well established [BK11, Bri11, CAC+10],
even to the extent or proscriptive accounting rules in some jurisdictions, e.g.
FAS157. DVA on assets, as far as the authors are aware, has had only limited
attention [KS12]. We have presented a concrete example of an asset whose value
is dependent on the default of its owner (Goodwill) and shown how the potential
value lost on default can be hedged using an extension of [BK11]. Calibrating
our models to seven US banks over the crisis we have shown that the effect of
changes DVA on assets can have significant effects on reported profits.
This work complements existing studies on valuation adjustments to do
with creditworthiness, collateral, and funding [BK11, Bri11, CAC+10, BCPP11,
PPB11, Cre´12, BBPL12]. We note that DVA is specifically excluded from regu-
latory capital [BCB12] but is no less a trading reality. DVA hedging by proxy has
been suggested (WSJ). This works for spread changes, but not default events:
for example, imagine if Morgan Stanley had used CDS on Lehman.
Technically, as in [BK11] and pointed out by [KS12] (Sections 8.3.2 and
8.3.3), the key to analytic tractability is the use of repo accounts for financing.
Without this, analytic tractability is limited.
As well as the accounting point of view of our CONSTANT and PROGRES-
SIVE models we consider potential losses, and their hedging, relating to a tax
point of view with our AMORTIZING model. Thus we contribute to widening
the debate over the scope and application of DVA.
Banks have reported large changes in profits from effects of their own cred-
itworthiness on liabilities. Our investigation suggests that including creditit-
worthiness on assets can make the picture even more volatile. In balance sheet
terms, and hedging terms, this volatility is real.
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Appendix (online only): Market Data
All data is from Bloomberg. Bank data has been aligned to common quarter
ends.
Goodwill (MUSD) BAC WFC JPM C COF MS GS
30Jun07 65845. 11983. 45254. 39231. 13612. 2977. 3145.
30Sep07 67433. 12018. 45335. 39949. 12952.8 2554. 3161.
31Dec07 77530. 13106. 45270. 41053. 12830.7 3024. 3321.
31Mar08 77872. 13148. 45695. 43622. 12826.4 3053. 3507.
30Jun08 77760. 13191. 45993. 42386. 12826.7 2988. 3530.
30Sep08 81756. 13520. 46121. 39662. 12815.6 2961. 3553.
31Dec08 81934. 22627. 48027. 27132. 11964.5 2243. 3523.
31Mar09 86910. 23825. 48201. 26410. 13076.8 2226. 3528.
30Jun09 86246. 24619. 48288. 25578. 13381.1 6836. 3536.
30Sep09 86009. 24052. 48334. 25423. 13525. 6977. 3546.
31Dec09 86314. 24812. 48357. 25392. 13596. 7162. 3543.
31Mar10 86305. 24819. 48359. 25662. 13589.3 7169. 3575.
30Jun10 85801. 24820. 48320. 25201. 13588. 6749. 3548.
30Sep10 75602. 24831. 48736. 25797. 13593. 6766. 3507.
31Dec10 73861. 24770. 48854. 26152. 13591. 6739. 3495.
31Mar11 73869. 24777. 48856. 26339. 13597. 6743. 3322.
30Jun11 71074. 24776. 48882. 26621. 13596. 6744. 3323.
30Sep11 70832. 25038. 48180. 25496. 13593. 6709. 3643.
31Dec11 69967. 25115. 48188. 25413. 13592. 6686. 3802.
Stock Prices (USD) BAC WFC JPM C COF MS GS
30Jun07 48.89 35.17 48.45 512.9 78.44 69.63 216.75
30Sep07 50.27 35.62 45.82 466.7 66.43 63. 216.74
31Dec07 41.26 30.19 43.65 294.4 47.26 53.11 215.05
31Mar08 37.91 29.1 42.95 214.2 49.22 45.7 165.39
30Jun08 23.87 23.75 34.31 167.6 38.01 36.07 174.9
30Sep08 35. 37.53 46.7 205.1 51. 23. 128.
31Dec08 14.08 29.48 31.53 67.1 31.89 16.04 84.39
31Mar09 6.82 14.24 26.58 25.3 12.24 22.77 106.02
30Jun09 13.2 24.26 34.11 29.7 21.88 28.51 147.44
30Sep09 16.92 28.18 43.82 48.4 35.73 30.88 184.35
31Dec09 15.06 26.99 41.67 33.1 38.34 29.6 168.84
31Mar10 17.85 31.12 44.75 40.5 41.41 29.29 170.63
30Jun10 14.37 25.6 36.61 37.6 40.3 23.21 131.27
30Sep10 13.1025 25.115 38.06 39.1 39.55 24.68 144.58
31Dec10 13.34 30.99 42.42 47.3 42.56 27.21 168.16
31Mar11 13.33 31.71 46.1 44.2 51.96 27.32 158.6
30Jun11 10.96 28.06 40.94 41.64 51.67 23.01 133.09
30Sep11 6.12 24.12 30.12 25.615 39.63 13.51 94.55
31Dec11 5.56 27.56 33.25 26.31 42.29 15.13 90.43
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Profit (MUSD) BAC WFC JPM C COF MS GS
30Jun07 5761. 2279. 4234. 6226. 750.372 2582. 2333.
30Sep07 3698. 2173. 3373. 2212. −81.658 1543. 2854.
31Dec07 268. 1361. 2971. −9833. 226.568 −3588. 3215.
31Mar08 1210. 1999. 2373. −5111. 548.504 1551. 1511.
30Jun08 3410. 1753. 2003. −2495. 452.905 1026. 2087.
30Sep08 1177. 1637. 527. −2815. 374.139 1425. 845.
31Dec08 −1789. −2734. 702. −17263. −1421.55 −2295. −2121.
31Mar09 4247. 3045. 2141. 1593. −108.062 −177. 1814.
30Jun09 3224. 3172. 2721. 4279. 223. 149. 3435.
30Sep09 −1001. 3235. 3588. 101. 394. 757. 3188.
31Dec09 −194. 2823. 3278. −7579. 376. 617. 4948.
31Mar10 3182. 2547. 3326. 4428. 636.263 1776. 3456.
30Jun10 3123. 3062. 4795. 2697. 608. 1960. 613.
30Sep10 −7299. 3339. 4418. 2168. 803. 131. 1898.
31Dec10 −1244. 3414. 4831. 1309. 697. 836. 2387.
31Mar11 2049. 3759. 5555. 2999. 1016. 968. 2735.
30Jun11 −8826. 3948. 5431. 3341. 911. 1193. 1087.
30Sep11 6232. 4055. 4262. 3771. 813. 2199. −393.
31Dec11 1991. 4107. 3728. 956. 407. −250. 1013.
USD 5Y swap rate (%)
30Jun07 5.5095
30Sep07 4.8115
31Dec07 4.1865
31Mar08 3.3105
30Jun08 4.2715
30Sep08 4.0223
31Dec08 2.135
31Mar09 2.2298
30Jun09 2.94
30Sep09 2.6485
31Dec09 2.978
31Mar10 2.7275
30Jun10 2.0698
30Sep10 1.538
31Dec10 2.182
31Mar11 2.402
30Jun11 1.998
30Sep11 1.2594
31Dec11 1.233
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5Y CDS spread (bps) BAC WFC JPM C COF MS GS
30Jun07 12.5 10.5 19.33 11.667 27. 33.813 34.938
30Sep07 33.17 27.771 36.002 33.406 41.364 55.244 45.096
31Dec07 48.868 59.67 49.231 71.396 214.15 97.201 66.33
31Mar08 107.083 95.63 110.9 182.055 278.911 172.339 148.337
30Jun08 110.82 113.82 104.066 139.363 316.725 184.575 136.005
30Sep08 151.398 150.916 143.911 305.496 344.736 825.094 419.389
31Dec08 120.617 118.985 121.318 193.053 189.093 413.111 290.132
31Mar09 395.3 297.775 201.125 631.526 288.941 399.749 285.964
30Jun09 221.858 155.311 108.823 425.131 153.733 211.698 151.192
30Sep09 120.475 79.674 69.592 190.186 74.02 138.544 106.465
31Dec09 101.584 91.226 50.315 172.561 75.93 114.037 91.848
31Mar10 117.406 91.519 59.265 155.575 70.806 136.483 101.694
30Jun10 156.967 119.107 116.294 186.84 102.699 267.296 189.07
30Sep10 165.757 105.214 85.098 174.911 85.116 182.203 153.283
31Dec10 180.764 105.861 86.162 148.86 85.226 170.722 125.94
31Mar11 135.527 81.227 70.215 124.922 70.196 139.859 113.433
30Jun11 156.763 95.093 79.283 136.756 80.388 161.813 136.673
30Sep11 422.085 158.126 163.274 282.172 125.019 466.757 324.692
31Dec11 411.59 144.112 147.216 285.49 110.243 419.927 325.2
ATM Implied Volatility (%, 18M) BAC WFC JPM C COF MS GS
30Jun07 20.153 21.114 23.465 22.164 26.715 30.141 29.179
30Sep07 22.15 25.895 27.07 25.365 34.095 30.141 30.352
31Dec07 29.806 31.803 31.327 35.599 48.298 37.503 37.879
31Mar08 38.975 41.903 42.64 49.631 56.769 48.111 43.21
30Jun08 46.853 42.207 44.711 49.798 60.585 46.201 40.154
30Sep08 48.197 49.204 40.478 50.384 68.035 82.419 49.466
31Dec08 72.616 61.777 60.783 81.9 84.179 81.272 59.742
31Mar09 118.159 92.138 77.834 137.187 97.422 85.786 66.599
30Jun09 60.789 56.672 49.282 69.778 63.009 46.964 41.714
30Sep09 58.554 48.07 42.539 66.669 56.443 47.55 35.94
31Dec09 42.142 40.008 35.169 53.108 42.681 37.275 33.424
31Mar10 35.517 31.031 30.693 43.556 38.451 35.783 29.512
30Jun10 47.84 44.015 41.516 53.491 47.969 45.23 40.54
30Sep10 44.228 39.699 40.187 49.395 46.114 39.791 33.68
31Dec10 39.834 35.219 31.94 38.219 36.853 33.96 29.122
31Mar11 34.974 30.776 27.26 30.471 32.413 32.015 25.691
30Jun11 35.876 31.059 28.746 31.43 31.445 34.133 28.538
30Sep11 37.873 45.547 27.6 32.499 31.532 66.342 46.45
31Dec11 57.723 37.03 39.868 49.602 39.906 57.681 41.55
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